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TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE IN RELAY PROTECTION: DANGEROUS TENDENCIES 
 
Ɋɨɡɝɥɹɞɚɸɬɶɫɹɫɭɱɚɫɧɿɬɟɧɞɟɧɰɿʀɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭɪɟɥɟɣɧɨɝɨɡɚɯɢɫɬɭ: ɭɫɤɥɚɞɧɟɧɧɹ, ɡɛɿɥɶɲɟɧɧɹɤɿɥɶɤɨɫɬɿɜɢɤɨɧɭɜɚɧɢɯɮɭɧɤ-
ɰɿɣ, ɡɚɫɬɨɫɭɜɚɧɧɹɧɟɞɟɬɟɪɦɿɪɨɜɚɧɨʀɬɚɜɿɥɶɧɨɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɨɜɚɧɨʀ ɥɨɝɿɤɢ, ɜɢɤɨɪɢɫɬɚɧɧɹ Ethernet ɬɚ WiFi ɤɚɧɚɥɿɜ ɡɜ¶ɹɡɤɭ, 
ɡɧɢɠɟɧɧɹɧɚɞɿɣɧɨɫɬɿ. ȼɢɡɧɚɱɚɽɬɶɫɹɧɟɛɟɡɩɟɤɚɿɫɧɭɸɱɢɯɬɟɧɞɟɧɰɿɣɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭɪɟɥɟɣɧɨɝɨɡɚɯɢɫɬɭɣɧɟɨɛɯɿɞɧɿɫɬɶɫɬɜɨ-
ɪɟɧɧɹɧɟɡɚɥɟɠɧɨɝɨɜɿɞɪɨɡɪɨɛɧɢɤɿɜɬɚɜɢɪɨɛɧɢɤɿɜɪɟɥɟɡɚɯɢɫɬɭɟɤɫɩɟɪɬɧɨʀɤɨɨɪɞɢɧɚɰɿɣɧɨʀɪɚɞɢɮɚɯɿɜɰɿɜɞɥɹɜɢɪɨɛɥɟɧ-
ɧɹɡɚɝɚɥɶɧɨʀɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɿʀɬɚɲɥɹɯɿɜɪɨɡɜɢɬɤɭɪɟɥɟɣɧɨɝɨɡɚɯɢɫɬɭ. 
 
Ɋɚɫɫɦɚɬɪɢɜɚɸɬɫɹɫɨɜɪɟɦɟɧɧɵɟɬɟɧɞɟɧɰɢɢ ɜɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɢɪɟɥɟɣɧɨɣɡɚɳɢɬɵ: ɭɫɥɨɠɧɟɧɢɟ, ɭɜɟɥɢɱɟɧɢɟɤɨɥɢɱɟɫɬɜɚɜɵɩɨɥ-
ɧɹɟɦɵɯɮɭɧɤɰɢɣ, ɩɪɢɦɟɧɟɧɢɟɧɟɞɟɬɟɪɦɢɧɢɪɨɜɚɧɧɨɣɢɫɜɨɛɨɞɧɨɩɪɨɝɪɚɦɦɢɪɭɟɦɨɣɥɨɝɢɤɢ, ɢɫɩɨɥɶɡɨɜɚɧɢɟ Ethernet ɢ Wi-Fi 
ɤɚɧɚɥɨɜɫɜɹɡɢ, ɫɧɢɠɟɧɢɟɧɚɞɟɠɧɨɫɬɢ. Ɉɬɦɟɱɚɟɬɫɹɨɩɚɫɧɨɫɬɶɫɭɳɟɫɬɜɭɸɳɢɯɬɟɧɞɟɧɰɢɣɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹɪɟɥɟɣɧɨɣɡɚɳɢɬɵɢ 
ɧɟɨɛɯɨɞɢɦɨɫɬɶɫɨɡɞɚɧɢɹɧɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɨɝɨɨɬɪɚɡɪɚɛɨɬɱɢɤɨɜɢɩɪɨɢɡɜɨɞɢɬɟɥɟɣɪɟɥɟɡɚɳɢɬɵɷɤɫɩɟɪɬɧɨɝɨɤɨɨɪɞɢɧɚɰɢɨɧɧɨɝɨ 
ɋɨɜɟɬɚɫɩɟɰɢɚɥɢɫɬɨɜɞɥɹɜɵɪɚɛɨɬɤɢɨɛɳɟɣɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɢɢɩɭɬɟɣɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɹɪɟɥɟɣɧɨɣɡɚɳɢɬɵ. 
 
1. EXTRUSION INTO THE HISTORICAL DOMAIN 
For  over  a  hundred  years  all  the  tasks  of  relay  pro-
tection have been performed by electromechanical protec-
tion relays (EMR). The fact that EMRs are still widely 
used in many countries, including Russia (about 80-90% 
of all types of protections), proves that in general EPRs 
are capable of solving all the present problems of the re-
lay protection. However, during the past 15-20 years there 
has been a widespread displacement of EMR by micro-
processor-based relay protection devices (MPD). MPD 
and various programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that 
control the operating modes of electrical equipment, have 
become an integral part of our lives and, in many cases, 
there is no other device available to substitute for them to 
ensure the normal functioning of the power industry. This 
is not due to some unique features of microprocessor de-
vices, this is rather a result of the costs of the fully auto-
mated production of MPD based on printed circuit boards 
compared to the production of high-precision mechanics 
for the relays of the previous generation. 30-40 years ago 
due to the necessity for cutting production costs and im-
prove profitability of production, the development of the 
new types of EMRs was stopped and all efforts were fo-
cused first on the creation of the static solid-state protec-
tions,  and  then  on  the  development  of  MPDs.  The  first  
types of MPD simply copied all the functions and charac-
teristics of the relays of previous generations. New fea-
tures and capabilities of MPD have been implemented 
only many years after. This technical policy of manufac-
turers has resulted in the complete halting of the produc-
tion of all other types of protection by all of the world's 
leading manufacturers of the relay protection, and MPDs 
have become nearly the only available type of protection. 
Even the very first MPDs, which simply copied the 
functions of the static solid-state transistor-based relays, 
see Fig. 1, revealed serious problems of the MPDs: more 
frequent failures and irreparability due to the presence of 
the special microprocessor and non-volatile memory con-
taining the program. As a result,  while the relays of type 
RXIDF-2H built on transistors and other discrete compo-
nents were quick to repair and return to operation, their 
microprocessor-based analogue RXIDK-2H must be dis-
carded. Hence, the microprocessor-based RXIDK-2H 
have long been taken out of service while RXIDF-2H are 
still used. The tendency of the relay protection reliability 
weakening associated with the transition to the MPD and 
noticed at the beginning of this process can be traced so 
far, despite the fact that modern generation of the MPDs 
have little in common with the first samples manufactured 
a few decades ago, see Fig. 1. This goes to prove that the 
problem is systemic rather than a result of the single tech-
nical defects specific to early MPD models. But no one 
wanted to gain the character of retrograde and nobody 
wanted to talk about the obvious problems of MPDs wel-
comed with such rapturous applause. 
 
Fig. 1. Two current relays with independent time delay, both with 
equal technical parameters, dimensions and characteristics made in 
the identical standard cases COMBIFLEX® manufactured by the 
same company (ABB), the left – the static solid-state relay RXIDF-
2H, the right – microprocessor-based relay RXIDK-2H. 1 – input 
current transformer; 2 – output electromagnetic relays;  
3 – transistors of the static relay and specialized microprocessor  
of the microprocessor-based one 
 
Moreover, since over the past decades billions of 
dollars have been invested in the ideas and technologies 
of the MPDs and as it has become the source of profit for 
thousands of scientists and engineers all around the world, 
all discussions about the problems and disadvantages of 
the MPDs have been nipped in the bud or met with fierce 
opposition by the representatives of manufacturers, scien-
tists, developers, designers and all other participants of 
this business. 
My past attempts to draw attention to the problems of 
the MPD [1, 2] caused fierce accusations of incompetence, 
misunderstanding of the basis of the relay protection, and 
even of an attempt to slow down the technological progress. 
2. ABOUT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE  
The cheapness and availability of the highly-
integrated microprocessors, industrial controllers and ad-
vanced electronic components, a huge and ever expanding 
range of such components available on the market, ex-
tremely high performance of the equipment designed for 
automatic installation and soldering of the surface mounted 
components of printed circuit boards, automatic test sys-
tems for the ready-made printed boards – all these remove 
the previous restrictions to the complexity of the electronic 
systems and their field of application. This is the reason 
why the microprocessors can now be found everywhere, 
even in toilet seats, where they measures the temperature of 
the corresponding part of the body and control the built-in 
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shower water heater to equalize its temperature with the 
temperature of the said part of the body [3]. 
Such an universal expanding usage of microproces-
sor-based electronic components in all fields of the tech-
nology together with their persistent sophistication define 
the tendency of the technology development. This tendency 
is what we call an "advance" in the development of engi-
neering and technology. Of course, there are certain fields 
of engineering and technology where computing and mi-
croprocessors are "must haves" and microprocessor tech-
nology has really enabled making a technological leap. 
However, implementation of the microprocessor-based 
devices is not always required due to the technical require-
ments to the products, and the number of such cases grows 
like an avalanche. Nevertheless, if you look at this ten-
dency not as a bystander but as the "insider", in charge in 
maintenance and repair of complex industrial electrical 
devices, such as relay protection, high-power battery 
chargers, inverters and converters, uninterruptible power 
supplies, etc., you have to ask yourself if the tendency can 
really help the technical advance. You have to ask "Why?" 
Just  because  the  current  boom  resulted  from  the  
sharp sophistication of the devices and ever-widening 
usage of microprocessors in all fields of technology, and 
is generated by the intention of the manufacturers to out-
perform competitors, as well as their rush for innovations 
and increased profits by any and all means rather than by 
the real needs. 
The aim to create something new or to reduce produc-
tion costs could only be welcomed if this trend of substitut-
ing analog systems on discrete electronic components, 
which have proved their reliability for tens of years, to mi-
croprocessor-based would not lead to the significant so-
phistication of the equipment, making it irreparable, unreli-
able and expensive in maintenance in addition to the need 
for the sharp increase of qualification of the personnel. 
When you order the equipment, all these problems stay in 
the background, and you face them only during the mainte-
nance. This is the price that the consumers must pay for the 
so-called "advance", that is, for the thoughtless and irre-
sponsible complication of the devices, which is often 
proved only with the "technological fashion" and pursuit of 
profit. More details on this issue in [3]. 
 
3. SMART GRID – ONE MORE DANGEROUS 
VECTOR OF THE "TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE" 
IN POWER INDUSTRY 
You  could  hardly  find  a  media  which  did  not  re-
sound with Smart Grid praises. The so-called "intelligent 
network" or Smart Grid is the technological "top fashion" 
promising us unprecedented wealth. Today everyone talks 
about his or her contribution to the development of this 
new fashioned trend. It turns out that not only the micro-
processor-based power meters, but even electro-furnace 
transformers, reactive power compensation devices, su-
perconducting power cables, etc., all are the elements of 
the "Smart Grid", and require investments in manufacture. 
Thus, governments create targeted investment programs 
and allocate billions spinning a huge wheel for sucking up 
and dispersal of the state budgets in the nondescript and 
unclear direction [4]. 
As  is  known,  the  Smart  Grid  concept  assumes  the  
installation of microprocessors in absolutely all elements 
of the power production, distribution and metering sys-
tems as well as arrangement of data channels between 
them based on the computer networks, which are gener-
ally wireless (Wi-Fi). The apologists of the Smart Grid 
see  the  future  power  system  as  a  fancy  modern  online  
game with thousands of participants - the components of 
the power networks. If we also consider the millions of 
the household power meters united in a common com-
puter network (i.e., millions of potential points of network 
access for hackers), the grandeur and the danger of this 
idea due to the sharp increase in vulnerability of the 
power systems to hacker attacks, computer viruses and 
remote intentional destructive electromagnetic impacts 
(which are detailed in [4]) becomes even more obvious. 
Today, the low-power, high-altitude electromagnetic 
pulse of a nuclear explosion set off in near space over the 
territory of a country is regarded as a real type of the so-
called nonlethal weapons capable of disabling all the mi-
croelectronic devices over the whole country while not 
injuring people [17]. Alas, all these dangers, or "horror 
stories" as they are disparagingly referred to by some pro-
ponents of the "technological advance" in its present 
form, are hardly considered by scientists and engineers 
who receive their payrolls from the funds allocated to the 
development of the Smart Grid. They often say: our task 
is to advance the technologies, while protection of the 
national power systems is the "headache" of the army and 
intelligence agencies. Defectiveness of such an ideology 
is obvious and does not even require an explanation. 
 
4. DANGEROUS TENDENCIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE RELAY PROTECTION 
In previous publications we repeatedly drew atten-
tion to the dangers of some tendencies in the development 
of relay protection that is strongly promoted by the devel-
opers and manufacturers of the MPDs: 
1. Continuous sophistication of the MPDs and in-
creasing the number of protective functions in a single 
terminal [6, 10]. 
2. Overloading the MPDs with functions unusual to 
the relay protection, such as the monitoring of electrical 
equipment [11, 12]. 
3. Use of a non-deterministic logic in MPDs, as well 
as so-called "advance actions" that lead to the risk of the 
loss of control over the relay protection actions [11, 12]. 
4. Wide use of free programmable logic [13] in 
MPDs, resulting in the significant increase in the percent-
age of staff mistakes and faults of protection. 
5. Complication of the serviceability checks and 
maintenance of the relays, while integrating numerous 
MPDs of different types and brands with different designs 
and software in the same power network. The lack of the 
common standards  for  the  MPD design  and software  in-
creases the intellectual load on staff and leads to signifi-
cant economic losses [14]. This situation is exacerbated 
with every passing year. 
6. The dramatic weakening of the electromagnetic 
immunity of the relay protection and the whole power 
system in proportion to the usage of the MPDs [15-17]. 
7. Increased vulnerability of the power systems to 
hacker attacks resulting from the expansion of the micro-
processor-based devices and the usage of the cheap Ethernet 
and Wi-Fi lines instead of the relatively protected optoelec-
tronic cables in the relay protection systems [18]. 
This sophistication, of both hardware and software, 
has not sunk in. As shown in [1, 5-9], even now the tran-
sition to the MPDs is accompanied by a significant de-
cline in the reliability of the relay protection. However, 
the advocates of microprocessor-based relay protection 
believe that we should not be satisfied with what has al-
ready been achieved and must further sophisticate the 
MPDs by increasing the number of functions performed 
by a single terminal, by using freely-programmable logic, 
non-deterministic logic based on the theory of neural 
networks and algorithms of pre-emptive action, by over-
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loading the MPDs with the functions of information-
measuring systems and monitoring systems of power 
equipment and by using the wireless communication 
channels (Wi-Fi) between relays, etc. 
The new-fangled ideas and developments in the field 
of  MPDs  are  no  longer  limited  only  to  the  functions  of  
relay protection. It is supposed that in the near future not 
only relay protection, but the whole power systems should 
correspond to the Smart Grid concept, which implies that 
all the power equipment of power system elements must 
be based on microprocessors to manage the exchange of 
synchronization signals and control commands between 
such elements via Wi-Fi. 
What alluring prospects and inviting horizons! What 
enormous amounts of money are to be allocated from the 
government budgets to the new programs in the power 
systems! So many research and production teams can 
subsist on these budgets, periodically suggesting more 
and more improbable, but very "beautiful" ideas, and put-
ting on the market more and more sophisticated but less 
reliable products. 
It's a huge business, and nobody wants to be banned 
from this sweet "cake". The participants in this business 
are not concerned about the latest affects of their activities 
and seek only to quickly "push" their new-fashion ideas to 
the market. 
Business is business and its fundamental laws are 
the same in all countries and areas, including such sensi-
tive ones as relay protection and power management and 
control. Do you need a proof? Read the motto to the re-
port on the symposium "Distribution systems of the fu-
ture: Novel ICT solutions as the backbone for smart dis-
tribution" published in the PAC World magazine: 
 
Fig. 2. The motto to the one of the articles in the worldwide 
popular specialized magazine "Protection, Automation and  
Control Magazine" – PAC World, September, 2011 (in the border) 
 
The keywords in this motto are: "urgently" and "man-
datory", that is, without the careful analysis of the remote 
effects of these innovations and without "unnecessary" criti-
cism. Thus it has worked until today it is worldwide. 
There was a period of sharp criticism of my publica-
tions and total negation of the non-amenities of the above 
relay development tendencies. However, in recent years 
many experts have started to understand the problems I 
have revealed (and, generally, without any reference to 
my earlier articles in major technical magazines of Rus-
sia, Europe and USA). For example, at the Second Inter-
national Conference "Actual Trends in Developments of 
Power System Protection and Automation" (Moscow, 
September 7-10, 2009) B. Morris, R. Moxley, C. Kusch 
(Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, USA) submitted a 
report: "Then Versus Now: A Comparison of Total 
Scheme Complexity", where they questioned the need for 
further sophistication of the protection and appealed to 
the comparative assessment of the reliability of the simple 
electromechanical relay protection and multifunction mi-
croprocessor-based protection systems. They stated that 
they have identified a trend of downward reliability of the 
relay protection systems built on sophisticated microproc-
essor-based devices. 
The unreliability of MPDs was also raised by V.I. 
Pulyaev (FSK UES, Russia) at the Third International 
Conference "Actual Trends in Developments of Power 
System Protection and Automation" (St. Petersburg, May 
30 – June 3, 2011). He particularly noted that the signifi-
cant failure rate of relaying accounts for microprocessor 
units (approximately 23 % of all cases), which constitute 
only about 10% of the total number of protection devices. 
This is definitely one of the most important factors deter-
mining the need for special measures to enhance the reli-
ability of the MPDs. 
Now late Alexey Shalin (Ph.D., a professor of Elec-
tric Power Stations Department of the Novosibirsk State 
Technical University, leading specialist of LLC "PNP 
BOLID", Novosibirsk), in his article responding to one of 
my publications (see A. Shalin, "Microprocessor-based 
relay protection: analysis of the efficiency and reliability 
is required," in "News of Electrical Engineering", 2006, 
No. 2) commented that the percentage of malfunctions of 
the modern relay panels and cabinets often was signifi-
cantly higher than of the old defenses based on electro-
mechanical relays. He also presented statistical data con-
firming that the transition from the defenses based on 
electromechanical relays to microprocessor terminals was 
accompanied with the significant reduction in the effi-
ciency and reliability. 
The  unreliability  of  current  MPDs was  the  focus  of  
the  articles  by  A.N.  Vladimirov  (Central  Dispatch  Ad-
ministration of UES of Russia); S. Swain, D. B. Ghosh 
(Integrated Electrical Maintenance) and others [19]. 
J.  Stokoe and J. Gray. in their report "Development 
of a Strategy for the Integration of Protection & Control 
Equipment" submitted at the 7th International Conference 
"Developments in Power Systems Protection" (Amster-
dam, 9-12-th April 2001) pointed out that the old elec-
tromechanical relays were strong and durable devices 
with a lifetime of 25 years, whereas the life of modern 
microprocessor-based protection is 15 years or less. 
They  echoed  by  J.  Polimac  and  A.  Rahim  (PB  
Power, United Kingdom) who declared that the transition 
from electromechanical relays to microprocessor-based 
ones reduced the lifetime of protection from 40 years 
(EMR) to 15-20 years, and sometimes even to only a few 
years after commissioning (MPD) [19]. 
The Head of Computer Department of Engineering and 
Technology College (University of Poona, Maharashtra, 
India) Ashok Kumar Tiwari B. E. noted that the integration 
of numerous functions in a single microprocessor terminal 
significantly reduced the reliability of the relay protection, 
since the failure of the terminal will result in the loss of too 
many features, compared to the system where these func-
tions are distributed among several terminals [19]. 
The necessity to limit the number of functions com-
bined in a single MPD terminal was also mentioned in the 
report by V.A. Efremov, S.V. Ivanov (IC "Bresler") and 
D.V.  Shabanov  (Russia  FGC)  "Actual  Trends  in  Devel-
opments of Power System Protection and Automation" 
also submitted at the same Third International Confer-
ence, mentioned above. 
A. Fedosov and E. Pusenkov, (a subsidiary of OAO 
"SO UES" ODE Siberia) in their article "Problems arising 
from the introduction of microprocessor technology in the 
emergency control systems" ("Power Stations", 2009, No. 
12)  noted  the  lack  of  the  strict  standards  on  the  MPD  
hardware and software has resulted in too great a variety 
of  programs  and  algorithms  built  in  the  power  system  
MPDs, which has lead to the faulty operations and in-
creased the likelihood of faults of such devices. 
The sharp vertical growth of the tasks performed by 
the personnel servicing the relay protection after the tran-
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sition from EMR to MPD was referenced as the cause of 
severe accidents in power systems by D. Rayworth and 
M. A. Rahim (PB Power, UK) [19]. 
A. Belyaev, V. Shirokov and A. Emelyantsev (Spe-
cialized Department "Lenorgenergogaz", St. Petersburg) 
in their article "Digital terminals of RPA. Adapting to 
Russian conditions" ("News of Electrical Engineering", 
2009, No. 5) also considered the complexity of program 
interface and the necessity for inputting numerous set 
points during the programming of MPDs. 
The poor electromagnetic environment in the most 
of the old substations designed and built for the electro-
mechanical relay protection, and not for microprocessor-
based devices, as well as the resulting numerous MPD 
faults were noted by B.I. Kovalev, I.E. Naumkin (Siberian 
Energy Research Institute); A.M. Bordachev (JSC "Insti-
tute Energosetproject"), M. Matveev and M. Kuznetsov 
(OOO "Aesop"); P. Montignies, B. Jover (Schneider Elec-
tric, France); V. Nadein ("Arkhenergo"); V. Lopukhov 
(SUE "Tatenergo PEO"); A. Ermishkin (JSC "Mo-
senergo"),  R.  Borisov (NPF "ELNAP",  Moscow);  A.  W.  
Sowa, J. Wiater (Electrical Department, Biaáystok Tech-
nical University, Poland) and others. 
Many experts noted that the vulnerability of MPD to 
the electromagnetic interference is several orders higher 
than that of traditional electromechanical counterparts, and 
therefore to ensure the electromagnetic compatibility 
(EMC) of the secondary circuit their level of electromag-
netic protection has to be significantly higher. Thus an ac-
ceptable level of MPD reliability can be reached only after 
providing for their EMC. Low EMC survivability of the 
MPDs is closely related to the deeper and more dangerous 
problem of remote intentional destructive electromagnetic 
impacts on the MPD, which we first considered in [15]. 
Many countries have already developed the devices 
that can remotely disable any microprocessor-based in-
dustrial systems (including the MPD, of course), so this 
problem was the focus of the numerous articles in techni-
cal magazines written by such well-known experts like 
Manuel W. Wik (Defense Materiel Administration, Swe-
den) and William A. Radasky (Metatech Corporation, 
USA),  and  also  it  was  included  in  the  reports  of  special  
committees of the U.S. Congress (e.g., see: "Report of the 
Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States 
from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack", 2008). 
Another previously unknown challenge of the relay 
protection is the so-called cyber vulnerability of the 
MPDs (and, consequently, of the whole grid), or exposure 
to hacker attacks. 
The paralysis of control systems, major outage of 
whole power systems, chaos within control systems, dis-
connection of Internet and cellular phones are all in the 
scenario of cyber war in the American apologists’ opin-
ion. Moreover, considering the strategic importance of 
such objects as power systems such attacks will rather be 
organized by special military cybernetic units than by 
single hackers. And such units have already been estab-
lished in many countries of the world. 
Last year the US Cyber Command started its opera-
tions. Being a part of the National Security Agency (NSA), 
the top secret and one of the most powerful intelligent 
agencies of the world, under the command of General 
Keith Alexander, the organization has united all previously 
existing cyber safety departments of the Pentagon. A year 
ago Cyber Command had about 1,000 employees, but the 
military had announced its initiation of a major hiring plan 
for particular specialists to increase the number of employ-
ees of this unit of NSA to 10,000 people. 
Some of them will be in charge of the protection of 
military and state infrastructures as well as of the most 
important commercial properties of the state. It’s obvious 
that such a large structure will not only protect from the 
hacker attacks, but will also develop hacker attacks (after 
all, attack is the best defense). The current Head of Cyber 
Command, and Director of NSA General K. Alexander 
has declared at hearings of the Military Service Commit-
tee of House of the USA that the effect of cyber weapons 
is comparable to the effect of mass destruction weapons. 
Cyber weapons are on the fast track. Experts say that 
many  countries  -  including  the  USA,  Russia,  China,  Is-
rael, Great Britain, Pakistan, India, Northern and South 
Korea - have developed sophisticated cyber weapons 
which can repeatedly get into computer networks and are 
capable of destroying them. In 2010 the cyber budget of 
USA reached 8 billion USD, and in the future this amount 
will further grow. In 2011, USA plans to embrace a new 
doctrine of cyber safety. Its aims were revealed in a pol-
icy paper by Deputy Head of the Pentagon William Linn 
III under the symbolic name "New Space Protection". The 
main idea of the paper is that from now on the USA con-
siders cyber space as the potential battlefield along with 
land,  sea  and air.  In  parallel,  NATO has  started  to  work  
on the development of a collective cyber safety concept. 
At  an  Alliance  Summit  held  in  November  2010,  it  was  
decided to develop a Cyber Safety Action Plan. The 
document should be ready by April 2011 and signed in 
June. The main concept of the document centers around 
the creation of a NATO Cyber Accident Response Center. 
Initially the Center was planned to be commissioned in 
2015 but on the insistence of the USA this has been re-
duced by three years. 
Effectiveness of cyber weapon was proved by the 
widely known cyber attack on the uranium enrichment 
plant in Natanz, Iran, with Win32/Stuxnet worm which 
destroyed hundreds of centrifuges. 
Another massive attack was mounted in September 
2011 on the Japanese corporation Mitsubishi Heavy In-
dustries, engaged in the production of important parts of 
the F-15 jets, Patriot missile complexes, submarines, sur-
face ships, rocket engines, guidance and intercept ballistic 
missiles systems, and other military equipment. Computer 
equipment of the corporation (45 private servers and 
around 50 PCs) was infected with a set of viruses, which 
took complete control over it. The viruses allowed con-
trolling the computers from the outside and transfer the 
available data. Some viruses were aimed to activate the 
built-in computer microphones and cameras. This allowed 
the attackers to keep an eye on what's happening in the 
production and research facilities. Other viruses erased 
signs of cracking, which seriously complicated the as-
sessment of the damage. Information from the computers 
was transferred to 14 websites located in other countries, 
including China, Hong Kong, USA and India. 
Modern technologies allow infecting the computer 
system remotely through the encoded radio signals sent 
by unmanned aerial re-transmitters. Wi-Fi systems, which 
are planned to be the basis for Smart Grid, are particularly 
exposed to such infections. Built-in Wi-Fi modems have 
already been built into the MPDs by the leading Western 
manufacturers. 
In the past there were attempts of computer penetra-
tion into the power system of Israel made by Iran. Senior 
CIA analyst Tom Donahue at a meeting between govern-
ment officials and employees of USA companies from the 
power, water, oil and gas supply sector mentioned that 
CIA identified numerous attempts to penetrate the US 
power  grid.  Obviously,  we  can  state  that  the  cyber  wars  
have already started and while they will intensify over 
time, the vulnerability of power systems will continue to 
increase too due to the current tendencies, thus forming a 
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very dangerous vector. 
So today, we should stop turning a blind eye to the 
tangle of problems associated with the proliferation of the 
MPDs, disparagingly calling them "scary stories from 
Gurevich", since already today dozens of experts from 
many countries state that there are serious problems that 
need to be addressed. 
 
5. WHAT TO DO? 
In my opinion, it's time to put an end to the uncon-
trolled development of unproven and dangerous trends in 
the relay protection and automation systems, including 
the Smart Grid. 
This requires the establishment of the National Co-
ordinating Councils for the relay protection and intelligent 
networks, which must analyze current trends, develop 
national strategies and coordinate the standardization in 
these areas. 
The Councils should include independent experts and 
specialists in the field of relay protection, microelectronics, 
data protection and electromagnetic compatibility, who do 
not have economic ties with the development and produc-
tion  of  the  MPDs  or  the  elements  of  the  Smart  Grid.  It  
should be noted that a purely mercantile financial interests 
of individuals and even entire scientific and industrial 
groups, interested in the funding of any new digital tech-
nologies in the power sector and, in particular, in the field 
of the relay protection, regardless of the long-term effects 
of such technologies and not limited to any frameworks, 
may result in national disasters in the near future. 
New technologies in the field of relay protection, 
automation, communication and data transfer systems 
should not be introduced into service until the possible 
negative consequences of their wide distribution is fully 
considered in the light of accumulated experience, and 
until the effective measures to protect against remote in-
tentional destructive impacts, whether intentional elec-
tromagnetic impacts or hacker attacks, is developed. De-
velopment of measures to protect sensitive electronic 
equipment of power systems against intentional destruc-
tive impacts should be considered as one of the main tar-
gets and it should be funded by amounts not less than 
those spent for the development of new technologies, 
such as the Smart Grid. Development of any new tech-
nology, based on digital microelectronics, should be con-
sidered as complete and ready for use in power industry 
only after the development of measures to protect it from 
the intentional destructive impacts. 
New standards on microprocessor-based relay protec-
tion, which are required according to [20, 21], must include 
the requirements for the protection against intentional de-
structive impacts, as the current standards on electromag-
netic compatibility (EMC) consider only the stability of the 
equipment against natural effects, rather than against inten-
tional destructive electromagnetic impacts. 
I must carefully examine the ways to improve the re-
liability of the MPDs by means of the modern redundancy 
hybrid relays [22, 23]. 
I am sure that it is the only acceptable direction of 
the technical advance in such an important and basic sec-
tor of any national infrastructure as power industry. 
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Gurevich V.I. 
Technological advance in relay protection: dangerous  
tendencies. 
In the article, the modern lines in the development of relay protec-
tion are considered: complication, increasing number of functions, 
use of non-determined and free-programmed logic, use of 
Ethernet and Wi-Fi communications channels, decreasing reliabil-
ity. The article highlights the danger of the existing tendencies in 
relay protection development and the necessity for creation of new 
lines of relay protection that are independent of the current devel-
opers and manufacturers. The article calls for creation of an Ex-
pert Coordination Council of specialists for development of the 
general strategy and ways of relay protection. 
Key words – relay protection, tendency, evolution. 
